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Abstract  
For manufacturing firms in developing countries, there are high barriers to entry 
and to catching up with competitors in their global production networks (GPNs). This 
paper examines the case of a Mexican auto-parts manufacturer that succeeded in 
catching up in the automotive GPN. The author proposes that the door to GPNs is 
open thanks to frequent changes in the boundaries of firms, and also stresses the 
importance of the necessary conditions that generate opportunities, including 
institutional settings that facilitate market entry and catching up, and capability 
building by firms hopeful of entry. 
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Introduction 
 
The external conditions relevant to catching up for industries and firms in 
developing countries changed drastically in the 1980s. Previously, industries were 
organized by country and their markets were found within national borders. Firms made 
efforts to catch up under the protection of government regulations on imports and 
inward foreign investment. Since the 1980s such conditions have totally changed. Firms 
were deprived of protection due to liberalization policies on trade and investment 
adopted by governments. Some industries which were formerly organized within 
national borders were reformed and reorganized into global production networks 
(GPNs). The changes in industrial organization on a global scale obliged firms to 
redefine catching up strategies in order to secure positions within the newly formed 
networks. Without the protection of the government and with intensified global 
competition, it became much more difficult than before for developing country firms to 
catch up with others already established in global markets. 
This paper examines the necessary condition for the catching up of firms in 
developing countries in GPNs, using the case of the Mexican firm Nemak, an 
original-equipment manufacturer (OEM) auto parts producer.  
The reason for focusing on Nemak is as follows. The automobile industry is one 
of several industries that experienced changes in industrial organization since the 1980s, 
from being organized within national borders to being a GPN (Hoffman and Kaplinsky 
1988; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Barnes and Kaplinsky 2000; Veloso and Kumar 
2002; Humphrey 2003; Lall and Zhang 2004; Wad 2008; Sturgeon, Biesebroeck, and 
Gereffi 2008). The production of automobiles consists of two sectors, the production of 
auto parts and their assembly into completed vehicles. Dominating the GPN is a small 
number of large automobile manufacturers, principally in developed countries. They 
decide the qualifications required for auto-parts suppliers and coordinate a stratified and 
globally extended network of suppliers. The qualification for suppliers is highly 
demanding, and the supply chains are densely populated with developed country firms. 
The case of Nemak is interesting because this firm is one of a small number of 
auto-parts suppliers in developing countries that entered the chain as a latecomer and 
succeeded in catching up to the world's leading producers1 in its market segment. By 
                                                   
1 According to Automotive News June 17, 2013, Nemak was ranked the 52nd among 
the top 100 global OEM parts suppliers. Of the top 100 firms, only 8 were based in 
developing countries. http://www.autonews.com/assets/PDF/CA89220617.PDF.(accessed 
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examining the experience of Nemak, I expect to gain insights into the necessary 
conditions for other latecomer firms in developing countries to catch up in highly 
competitive GPNs. 
In the catching up process of firms in developing countries, I consider that the 
following three categories of conditions are important: the condition in general of the 
industry concerned, the capabilities of the firm concerned, and the institutional settings 
surrounding the firm. My proposition is that, in the case of Nemak, all three categories 
of conditions were favorable to the entry and catching up in the automobile GPN. 
Concerning the condition of the industry, special mention must be made of the 
dynamic nature of GPNs, which change over time due to competition among firms and 
by diffusion of innovation through learning by firms. Firms may get a chance to enter 
the GPN and to get space in them, thereby changing the composition of the network. 
This perspective is derived from the theoretical consideration of the boundary of firms. 
Langlois and Roberts (1995) propounded why and when a firm's boundaries 
changes. According to them, firms consist of two distinct but changing parts, the 
intrinsic core capabilities and the rest of its ancillary capabilities. 
“The boundaries of the firm, which are defined as the extent to which ancillary 
capabilities will be internalized or bought through the market, depend (1) on the 
strength of the firm’s own capabilities relative to those that can be purchased and 
(2) on the respective transaction and governance costs involved in making or 
buying the capabilities. Both the intrinsic core and the ancillary capabilities, and 
the prevailing levels of transaction costs may be expected to change over time 
because they are underpinned by knowledge (Langlois and Robertson 1995, p. 7).  
Thus in the long run, the boundaries of the firms may be altered as firms gain 
experience in the market and GPN. 
Although the changes in a firm's boundary may offer it the chance of entry to a 
GPN, it may not be a sufficient condition. In order to take advantage of a chance to 
enter a GPN, a firm’s own conditions, such as the capability to recognize opportunities 
and the ability to exert efforts to catch up in the GPN, may also be necessary. Another 
necessary condition will be institutional settings which enable the firm’s capability 
building. 
In the following sections, I will show how and why these three categories of 
conditions favorably affected the catching up by Nemak.  
                                                                                                                                                     
February 25, 2014) 
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The paper is divided in four parts. In the first section, the focus is on the process 
of industrial restructuring of the Mexican automobile industry. I will show that in the 
course of changing institutional settings presented by the Mexican government’s 
industrialization policy from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to export 
industrialization, a majority of local firms dropped out of the industry and only a limited 
number of local firms, including Nemak, were able to survive. In the second part, I 
examine the conditions under which Nemak achieved entry to the automobile GPN. It 
will be shown that the transition of institutional settings in the 1980s and the preceding 
growth of Mexican firms with proprietary capabilities favored the entry of Nemak to the 
GPN. In the third section, the process of Nemak's catching up with global suppliers will 
be examined. In order to be a global OEM supplier in the automobile industry, the 
necessary condition is to locate plants in proximity to the major automobile assemblers. 
I focus on how Nemak could clear this hurdle. In the final section I summarize how and 
why Nemak caught up to global suppliers, and discuss the necessary conditions for 
catching up by developing country firms in the GPN, drawing lessons from the 
experience of Nemak. 
 
I. Dropping Out or Catching Up: Two Trajectories of Local Firms in the Mexican 
Automobile Industry 
 
1. Development of the Mexican Automobile Industry 
 
As of 2011, Mexico ranked eighth in the world automobile industry in production 
and fourth in exports. As an automobile producing country, a peculiarity of Mexico is 
that the majority of assembled cars are exported to the US market, the most competitive 
market in the world. In contrast, other major developing countries with automobile 
production such as China, India, and Brazil largely depend on the local markets for the 
sales of their products, as shown in Figure 1.  
The rapid growth of production and export of automobiles in Mexico started at 
the end of the 1980s. It is possible to divide the development of the Mexican automobile 
industry into three periods, taking government policy on the automobile industry as 
benchmarks. The first period, from 1962 to 1976, is the period of ISI. The period after 
1989 is the period of export industrialization. The years between 1977 and 1988 can be 
considered as the period of transition from ISI to export industrialization.  
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The first period began in 1962 with the issue of the first government decree 
concerning the automotive industry. Until then foreign and Mexican firms undertook the 
assembly of automobiles from imported complete knockdown kits, and importation of 
finished cars was prohibited. The principal points of the new decree were the 
prohibition of imports of engines and power-train components, locally manufactured 
content of 60% or more for assembly firms, the prohibition of production of auto parts 
by assembly firms except for engines and those parts which had been manufactured by 
assemblers before the 1962 decree, and the restriction to a maximum foreign capital 
participation of 40% in newly formed auto-parts firms (Hoshino 2001, pp. 100-102). 
The 1962 decree succeeded in starting a Mexican auto-parts industry with firms having 
60% or more Mexican ownership.  
The 1962 decree aimed at import substitution by auto-parts production, but within 
a few years it began to show its limitations in terms of production efficiency and foreign 
exchange saving. The inefficiency was caused by the lack of economies of scale 
because the government could not restrict the number of assemblers and the number of 
vehicle types and models produced. As for foreign exchange saving, although domestic 
production of auto-parts brought down the volume of imported parts per vehicle, the 
volume for the industry as a whole increased as the number of cars produced increased  
(Hoshino 2001, p.103). The subsequent export promotion policy was expected to 
resolve these two problems at once. 
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 The second period began with the issue of the decree of 1977, which fostered 
exports of the automobile industry. Export promotion had already begun with a decree 
issued in 1972 which obliged assemblers to earn from their own exports a certain 
percentage of the foreign exchange needed for importing parts, but this did not achieve 
its intended outcome. To foster the industry’s exports, the decree of 1977 obliged 
assemblers to procure all of the foreign exchange they needed for importing parts 
through a newly introduced foreign currency rationing system until 1982. Also, at least 
50% of assemblers’ exports had to have parts from Mexican auto-parts firms (Hoshino 
2001, pp. 104-105). In order to induce assemblers to export, various incentives were 
provided, which will be mentioned in the following section. The period is characterized 
as transitional because the essential elements of the ISI policy remained in effect until 
1989, including prohibition of imports of finished cars, prohibition of auto-parts 
production by assemblers, national content regulation, and restriction of foreign capital 
to 40% for newly formed auto-parts firms, although they were relaxed by a decree 
issued in 1983.  
The third period, namely, the period of export industrialization, began with a 
decree issued in 1989 that lifted the remaining elements of the ISI decrees and resulted 
in expanded automobile exports. The principal elements of the decree of 1989 were the 
liberalization of auto-parts procurement by assemblers, the liberalization of auto-parts 
production by assemblers and foreign-owned auto-parts manufacturers, and the approval 
of assemblers’ imports of finished cars subject to the favorable balance of their exports 
and imports. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which took effect in 
1994 further accelerated the liberalization process. It required abolition of the national 
contents regulation and also abolition of the obligation of foreign exchange balance by 
assemblers until 2004 (Serita 2000, p.7-8). 
As the restrictions of government regulations were lifted, the assemblers—all 
of which were based in developed countries—expanded production of vehicles in 
Mexico. Figure 2 shows that in the ISI period their annual production was less than 
400,000 vehicles in total, but in the period of export industrialization the total 
production expanded fourfold, from 640,000 in 1989 to 2,557,000 in 2012. Mexico in 
2011 was in fourth position in the world in automobile exports, so it is safe to conclude 
that the Mexican automobile industry has succeeded in catching up to the world’s 
principal producing countries in the past three decades.  
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The catching up of the industry in general is a positive side of the development 
of the Mexican automobile industry. The negative side of the story was the dropping out 
of local auto-parts producers in the process.  
 
2. Catching Up of the Industry and Dropout of Local Firms 
 
Before the issue of the decree of 1962, few auto-parts firms existed in Mexico. 
Due to the decree, in order to continue production the assemblers were forced to help 
found auto-parts firms. Two types of auto-parts makers were brought into being. One 
was a small number of large-scale firms producing principal auto-parts; many of which 
had foreign auto-parts makers as shareholders but with majority shares held by Mexican 
entrepreneurs. Involved in the establishment of this type of auto-parts firms were the 
foreign assemblers, which functioned as matchmakers bringing together foreign 
auto-parts manufacturers and Mexican industrialists. The other type was a large number 
of small-scale manufacturers producing simple, low-cost parts, most of which were 
owned 100% by Mexican capital and many beginning production by licensing foreign 
technology (Bennett and Sharpe 1985, pp. 129-30; Bennett 1986, pp. 18-19). 
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Thus, during the period of ISI, the main actors in auto-parts production were 
Mexican local firms. The situation began to change when the Mexican government 
lifted the regulation on imports of auto-parts and the regulation on investment by 
foreign firms in auto-parts production. This resulted in many Mexican auto-parts firms 
dropping out of the industry.  
To understand the scale of dropping out, I surveyed the survival rate of 
Mexican auto-parts firms that were registered in the directories of Mexican auto-parts 
manufacturers from the year 1986, when there was still regulation of foreign investment. 
I could confirm the names of 230 firms in two directories for 1986.2 Of these 230 firms, 
only 71 appeared again as auto-parts producers in the 2010 directories.3 This means 
that 159 firms, or almost 70% of those existing in 1986, disappeared in the sense that 
they did not exist under the same name in 2010. Another remarkable fact that was 
observed was changes in ownership in the surviving firms. Of the 71 firms, for at least 
25 firms the majority ownership had changed from Mexican to foreign. Data on the 
ownership for 8 firms were unavailable, and at least 38 firms maintained the majority 
Mexican ownership. However, of these 38 firms, 7 had changed from being a 
manufacturer of original equipment to a manufacturer of spare parts. These facts 
indicate a massive dropping out of Mexican local firms from the production of auto- 
parts during years from 1986 to 2010. 
Although there was massive dropping out of local firms, there were a few 
exceptional cases of survival and also of catching up, which I focus on in the following 
section. 
 
3. Catching Up of Local Firms: A Few Exceptional Cases 
 
 The dropping out of local firms from auto-parts production was a common 
phenomenon in developing countries where ISI had been promoted in the automobile 
                                                   
2 The directories of 1986 referred to are those issued by the association of Mexican 
auto-parts producers, or INA (Directorio de la Industria Nacional de Autopartes, 1986) 
and by JETRO (La Industria automotriz y de autopartes en México, 1986).  
3 The directories of 2010 referred to are those issued by INA (Directorio de Empresas 
Autopartes, 2010) and those by Mercamétrica Ediciones (Directorio industridada AAA, 
2010, Directorio industridada AA, 2010, Directorio industridada A, 2010, Directorio 
industridada B, 2010).  
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industry and a liberalization policy was later adopted. 4  The proportion of those 
surviving the changes of institutional settings was smaller in Mexico than in most other 
developing countries.  
 The directory of the Mexican auto-parts producers’ association, Industria 
Nacional de Autopartes (INA), for the year 2010 contains the names of 894 firms. 
Because of the lack of information on ownership of the registered firms in the directory, 
we cannot know exactly the proportion of local firms in the Mexican auto-parts industry, 
but a rough estimate of the percentage of foreign firms among auto-parts manufacturers 
was reported as 70% by Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
(CEPAL) and also by the Mexican Secretariat of Economy (CEPAL 2010; SE 2011). 
 Compared with other developing countries, the figure of 70% is rather high. 
The auto-parts producers’ association in Brazil reported that firms with 100% foreign 
capital and those with more than 51% in 2010 accounted for 31% and 8% of the 504 
member firms respectively (SINDIPEÇAS and ABIPEÇAS 2011). In the case of 
Thailand, the president of Thailand Automotive Institute reported that, of the 645 
auto-parts firms in the first tier of the supply chain, those with majority foreign 
ownership was 47% in 2010 (https://www.asean.or.jp/ja/invest/about/eventreports/ 
2011/2010/20.html accessed June 2, 2012). Therefore, Mexico has a much smaller 
percentage of local firms with a majority of locally owned shares than either Brazil or 
Thailand. 
Although it is hard to know the national ownership of firms in general, in the 
case of first-tier firms the information is relatively easy to access because they are 
large-scale firms which make more information publicly available. Using the INA 
directory and other sources, I surveyed the first-tier Mexican firms and identified 46 
with majority Mexican ownership. Of these 46 firms, 31 firms are subsidiaries of large 
Mexican business groups. 
The business group is the dominant form of organization of Mexican 
large-scale firms. In the period of ISI the groups were encouraged to invest in the 
auto-parts sector, which offered them a foothold for further growth (Hoshino 2001). We 
can easily see that they still hold space in the sector, even though the dominant actors 
                                                   
4 Marginalization of local firms with the advance of auto-parts firms of developed 
countries and the increased importation of auto parts is analyzed for India and Brazil 
by Humphrey (2003), for Korea by Wad (2008) and for South Africa by Barnes and 
Kaplinsky (2000).  
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are now foreign firms. Table 1 shows nine business groups, to which belong 31 first-tier 
Mexican auto-parts manufacturers. 
It is possible to classify these nine business groups into three categories according 
to their entry year to the auto-parts sector. The first consists of Proeza, Kuo, Grupo 
Industrial Saltillo, and Grupo Bocar, which entered the sector in the 1960s during the 
period of ISI. The second consists of Alfa and Vitro, which entered near the end of the 
1970s. Included in the third are Sanluis, Grupo Carso, and Quimmco, which entered the 
sector by acquisitions in the 1980s and after. These all were survivors of an adverse 
environment. In the next section I will examine how they survived, by focusing on the 
case of Nemak, which is the highest ranked global supplier among the subsidiaries of 
the nine business groups. 
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Table 1.  Principal Mexican First Tier Auto-Parts Suppliers
Name of
Business
Group
Name of Principal Subsidiaries in
Auto-Parts Sector
Principal Products
Group's
Entry Year
to Auto-
Parts
Industry
Number of
Employees
of Auto-
Parts
Section
(2012)
　　　Proeza
Metalsa、Perfektools、Teknik、Novo
Cast
light duty frames, space
frames, body structures, safety
systems, suspension
structures, others
1960 about 8,000
Grupo Kuo
Transmisiones Equipos Mecánicos、
TF Victor、Pistones Moresa、Fricción
y Tecnología、Frenado Automotriz
manual transmission, varios
kinds of repair parts
1960 3,506
Grupo
Industrial
Saltillo
Cifunsa、Tisamatic
grey and nodular iron auto
parts for transmission and
brake systems, ductile and grey
iron castings
1964 2150　1
Grupo Bocar Bocar、Auma、Plastic Tec
precision parts and assembles,
plastic injection-moduled-
parts, aluminum and zinc die-
cast products
1967 about 6,000
Alfa Nemak、Castech
alminum cylinde head,
aluminum engine block
1979 20,312
Vitro
Vitro Automotriz、Vidrio Plano、Vitro
Flex
automotive flat glass 1979 5,839　２
Sanluis
Corporación
Rassini、Rassini Frenos、Bypasa
leaf springs for suspension,
rotors, drums, assemblies and
brake hubs
1988 4,417
Grupo Carso
Gabriel de México、Arela、Arcomex、
Cordaflex, Sealed Power Autopartes
wireharness, cables, shock
absorber,
1992 18,500　3
Quimmco
Quimmco Centro Tecnológico、
Manufacturera de Cigueñales de
México、 Sistemas Automotrices de
México、Forja de Monterrey
axles, brakes, crankshafts and
related components
1994 about 5,000
Notes：1.Estimated employees number of 2008
　　2.Employees numberin flat glass sector.
　　3.Estimated employees number of Grupo Condumex of 2008.
Sources: Elaborated by Hoshino based on annual reports and information of home page of companies. 
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II. Restructuring of the Supply Chain in Mexico and Entry of Nemak to the 
Auto-Parts Sector 
 
1. Boundary of Firms in the Auto-Parts Industry 
 
 To understand the importance of the boundary of firms for examining the entry 
of Nemak to the auto-parts production, it is necessary to explain how supply chains are 
organized in the automobile industry. 
 A passenger car consists of at least 15,000 different parts. For the sake of 
convenience, I would like to classify them into three categories based on the degree of 
assembly: components, systems and modules. Components are the simplest level of auto 
parts. The components are assembled into systems, which have specific functions in the 
automobile. Systems and components are assembled to make a module, which is a unit 
of integrated systems5. For example, an automotive engine can be considered as a 
module because it is an integrated complex of functions that are performed by multiple 
systems. While the assembly of engines is generally done internally in assembly firms, 
the systems and other major components such as the oil pump, water pump, cylinder 
head and block, are provided by external suppliers. Figure 3 is a conceptual chart of the 
supply chain of the automobile industry. Although transactions may occur between 
suppliers of the same category, they are not indicated in the chart for the sake of 
simplicity.  
 The boundary of firms in the automobile industry in practice is the extent of 
                                                   
5 This classification is an idea of this author based on Veloso and Kumar (2002, pp. 
12-22).  
　　　Figure 3. Conceptual Chart of Supply Chain of Automobile Industry
　 　
　 　
　 　
　
 
Source: Elaborated by Hoshino.
Automobile 
Assembler 
Module Suppliers System
Suppliers
Components
Suppliers
System
Suppliers Components
Suppliers
Components
Suppliers
Component
Suppliers
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internal production as opposed to outsourcing needed parts. If we use the conceptual 
chart, it means where we can draw a boundary line between the assemblers and 
suppliers, for each category shown in the chart. Locations of boundary lines are not 
fixed, and can differ by the type of part. The assembly of engines is done internally by 
assemblers as mentioned above, so that in the case of engines the practical boundary 
line of the automobile assembler can be drawn below module suppliers in the chart. The 
locations of boundary lines can also change with time. In the past, the supply chains of 
Japanese assemblers and US assemblers were very different in the extent of 
internalization. The extent was much lower among Japanese assemblers than US 
assemblers, although the difference has now been narrowed because of the 
externalization of the auto-parts division by US automobile manufacturers due to 
intensified competition (Shimokawa 1990, p. 80). Another factor that changed the 
location of the boundary of firms is the changing institutional settings. 
 
2. Change of Institutional Setting and Entry of Mexican Firms to Auto-Parts 
Production 
 
 In the case of the Mexican automobile industry, we can interpret the 
institutional setting as the government policies represented in various decrees designed 
to regulate firms in the industry. As discussed previously, government policy changed in 
the past five decades from ISI to export industrialization, with a period of transition 
between them. With the changing of institutional settings, the boundaries of firms also 
changed. 
Until the issue of the decree of 1962, the supply chain described in Figure 3 did 
not exist in Mexico. By the decree, the boundary of assemblers was fixed. They were 
permitted only the assembly of automobiles and engines and also any auto parts which 
they had already been manufacturing in Mexico. The space outside of this boundary was 
reserved for Mexican local firms. System suppliers and components suppliers with more 
than 60% Mexican ownership were then founded and the creation of the supply chain 
was started. Proeza, Grupo Kuo, and Grupo Industrial Saltillo entered the auto-parts 
sector, taking advantage of the new institutional setting. 
Another change in the boundary of firms was the extension of system suppliers' 
boundary to the production of components. This was promoted by the decree of 1972, 
which extended the national contents regulation to auto-parts firms. Because of the lack 
of components suppliers, system suppliers had to internalize the production of needed 
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components in order to raise the percentage of national content in their products 
(Hoshino 2001, p. 111). 
In the transition period from 1977 to 1989, the change of institutional setting 
affected the boundary of firms in two ways. One way was by the obligation of 
assemblers’ self-procurement of foreign exchange needed for imports. This requirement 
could be met by increasing the local procurement of auto parts and thereby decrease 
total imports, which opened chances for new entries to the sub-sector and led to the 
second wave of entry to the auto parts sector by Mexican business groups. Another way 
to meet the foreign exchange requirement was to increase exports, which offered 
additional opportunities for entry to Mexican firms. Nemak entered the auto-parts sector 
by using the opportunity offered by the assemblers' efforts to increase exports. In the 
following section, the case of Nemak will be examined. 
Another change of institutional setting, which took place outside of the 
automobile industry, was the government promotion of maquiladoras, as the factories of 
the in-bond manufacturing industry are called. In order to improve the foreign exchange 
balance, the Mexican government permitted the establishment of firms with 100% 
foreign capital and exemption of import duty on equipment and materials, under the 
condition that all products were to be exported. This was an exception to the 1973 
foreign investment law which restricted the participation of foreign capital in newly 
established firms to no more than 49%. Foreign automobile manufacturers and 
auto-parts firms began to establish subsidiaries that produced auto parts in the 
maquiladoras during the transition period (Zapata, Hoshino and Hanono 1990, p.26). 
All of these products were exported, so the maquiladoras were not integrated with the 
existing supply chain in Mexico during that period. The boundary of the assemblers in 
Mexico could not extend to maquiladora auto parts production, so the two subsectors 
functioned separately. During the period of the export industrialization the 
maquiladoras became integrated with the supply chain in Mexico.  
In the period of the export industrialization, the drastic change in the 
institutional setting brought about changes in the boundaries of assemblers and 
auto-parts firms. By the liberalization of auto-parts procurement by assemblers, and the 
liberalization of auto-parts production by assemblers and foreign auto-parts 
manufacturers, the space reserved for local firms in the auto-parts sector was eliminated. 
With increased auto-parts imports and increased investment by assemblers and foreign 
auto-parts manufacturers, the assemblers changed their boundaries. The boundary of 
assemblers was extended to the auto-parts sector by integrating the maquiladoras within 
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the supply chain, by acquiring existing auto-parts firms, and by investing in newly 
established auto-parts firms. 
With regard to the auto-parts manufacturers, 70% of Mexican auto-parts firms 
existing in 1986 ceased to exist, as discussed earlier. Some of the surviving Mexican 
auto-parts firms extended their boundaries by acquiring the assets of firms that had 
closed, and some newly emerged business groups such as Grupo Carso and Sanluis 
entered the sector by acquiring the business of the closed firms (Hoshino 1996, p.44, 
p.52). Whether surviving or newly entered, they ceased to be dominant actors in the 
auto-parts sector. The dominant actors were now the foreign auto-parts manufacturers 
that entered Mexico by acquiring the assets of extinct firms, by investing in new 
subsidiaries, or by switching from the maquiladoras and integrating to the restructured 
Mexican supply chain.  
 
3. The Transition Period: Good Timing of Entry by Nemak 
 
 Nemak was established in 1979 as a joint venture of 75% by Alfa, a Mexican 
business group, and 25% by Ford for the production of aluminum cylinder heads for 
automobile engines. 
 The establishment of Nemak was a response by Ford to the decree of 1977. The 
decree obliged the assemblers to earn by exports the foreign exchange needed for 
imports. The assemblers responded in the same way, by exporting engines to the US 
market. For that purpose, they invested a huge amount of money in new engine plants. 
All five principal assemblers constructed new plants in the years between 1978 and 
1983 (Arteaga 1992, pp. 33-35). As a result, the capacity of production expanded to 
2,081,000 engines in 1983, while their production of passenger cars in the same year 
was only 210,000 (Studer-Noguez 2002, pp. 342-343). Another obligation of the 1977 
decree was that at least 50% of assemblers’ exports had to have parts from Mexican 
auto-parts firms. The restriction on foreign capital participation in auto-parts firms was 
still in effect during the period of transition, so the assemblers were forced to find, or to 
start themselves, local firms with the ability to manufacture auto parts of high enough 
quality to export to the US market. Nemak was founded to meet this need. 
  Ford selected Alfa as a project partner because it was considered the best 
Mexican alternative at that time due to its reputation based on technological capability, 
financial resources, and experience with joint ventures. The group was founded in 
1974 but its antecedent dates back to Cervecería Cuautémoc, a brewery founded in 
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1890. In the course of its development, the beer company diversified into industries 
such as glass, iron and steel, paper, chemical, petrochemical, and finance. The group as 
a whole was known as the Monterrey Group after the location of its headquarters. 
Monterrey Group was separated into four groups afterword, and Alfa was formed in 
1974 by taking the iron and steel and the paper business from Monterrey Group. Other 
groups spun off of the Monterrey Group were Vitro, FEMSA (formerly VISA) and 
Cydsa (Hoshino 1993, pp. 513-516)6. 
Alfa was a worthy project partner of Ford due to its reputation of technological 
capability in metalworking. Its iron and steel business, which was under a subsidiary 
named Hylsa, was founded in 1943 to produce the steel used to make beer bottle caps. 
When the imports of rolled steel from the US were suspended during World War II, the 
company succeeded in developing an innovative direct reduction method of 
steelmaking which was recognized worldwide (Hoshino 2001, p. 48).  
Around the year of Nemak’s foundation, Ford also started other two joint 
ventures, with Vitro for producing automotive glass, and with FEMSA for making auto 
parts by plastic injection. Though Vitro still is in business, FEMSA sold it due to the 
external debt problem in the 1980s. Ford also divested from both businesses in the 
process of externalizing their auto-parts division, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 Nemak’s yearly sales volume was in the range of 700,000 to 900,000 pieces 
during the 1984-1987 period. In 1988 it experienced significant growth to 1.5 million 
pieces, with the majority of the production exported. Around 40% of the production was 
exported directly to Ford’s engine plant in Canada and the rest was indirectly exported 
to the US market after being assembled into engines and finished automobiles. Although 
Ford participated in Nemak’s capital, its market was not limited to Ford but also 
included GM and Chrysler.7  
 The export of cylinder heads by Nemak increased rapidly in the 1980s. In the 
background was the external debt crisis that began in 1982. When Nemak was founded 
in 1979, the advantage of producing engines in Mexico was small considering the 
transportation cost. The principal reason why assemblers accepted the requirement of 
the decree was to secure the Mexican market, which was expanding under the economic 
                                                   
6 In a 1972 study of principal Mexican business groups, Alfa was listed in first place 
(Cordero and Santin 1977, 29). 
7 Nissan and Volkswagen produced their own engine cylinder heads. Information is 
taken from the interview carried out in the plant of Nemak in October, 1989.  
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boom triggered by petroleum exports. 
 
 
Conditions suddenly changed due to the large-scale devaluation of the peso 
caused by Mexico's external debt crisis. With the drastic improvement of cost 
competitiveness, Mexico obtained comparative advantage as a production site within 
the North American market (Studer-Noguez 2002, p.174). Figure 4 shows that exports 
of finished cars started in the mid-1980s. This increase was also affected by a dynamic 
in the US market which will be discussed in a later section. 
 Compared with the Mexican domestic market, the export market and especially 
the US market are more demanding with regard to quality, price, and delivery time. 
How did Mexican firms improve their capability to fill the gap? 
 
3. Capability Improvement of Mexican Firms in the Transition Period 
  
 Production of aluminum cylinder heads consists of melting aluminum scrap, 
casting the molten metal in a mold, and finishing by machine. Nemak adopted a process 
based on gravity casting in a semi-permanent mold. When Nemak started business, they 
contracted technological assistance from Teskid, an Italian firm recognized as one of the 
world leaders in this casting technology. In 1989 Teskid joined the venture with 20% 
capital participation, lowering the shares of Alfa and Ford to 60% and 20% respectively. 
Teskid withdrew fully from Nemak by 2000 at the latest but it can be assumed that the 
19 
 
period of Teskid’s capital participation was when Nemak's technological knowledge 
advanced most. At the same time Nemak also improved its capabilities by introducing a 
quality control system and a 'just in time' logistics system, training operating personnel, 
and recruiting engineers of higher educational level. Ford pushed the process along by 
demanding higher level of performance and at the same time by encouraging 
performance by means of recognition and awards for quality8. 
  The experience of Nemak was not exceptional. Zapata, Hoshino, and Hanono 
(1990) report the restructuring process of 12 auto-parts subsidiaries of seven Mexican 
business groups, pointing out the following findings. Firstly, after the external debt 
crisis of 1982, the firms seriously tackled the restructuring of their export-oriented 
business. Their seriousness was derived from two circumstances. They could not help 
but fight their way forward by exports due to the depressed domestic market, and 
because most business groups had a problem of huge external debts contracted during 
the economic boom and urgently needed foreign exchange to survive. Alfa was in this 
same situation. Secondly, foreign auto-parts firms generally participated as minority 
shareholders in the subsidiaries of business groups, so they could expect assistance 
from the foreign partners with respect to technology and market development. They 
also influenced auto-parts firms to improve their capabilities by pressure and 
encouragement, as seen in the case of Nemak. In the 1980s, the restriction on foreign 
capital participation was still in effect, so it was a unique and last chance for Mexican 
firms to make rapid major advances in capabilities under a protective institutional 
setting.  
 
III. Restructuring of the North American Supply Chain and Catching Up of 
Nemak 
 
1. Competition and Changing Boundary of Firms 
  
The rapid increase of Mexican automobile exports was affected by dynamic 
influences coming from two directions. As has been described, the first force was the 
change of industrial development strategy of the Mexican government from ISI to 
export industrialization. Another originated from the intensified competition in the US 
automobile market caused by the emergence of Japanese vehicle imports. 
                                                   
8 Source of information is same as footnote 7. 
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In the 1970s, consumer preferences in the US market shifted from large-sized 
vehicles to smaller-sized ones because of the oil shocks that greatly increased 
international petroleum prices, which also led to a US government mandate for higher 
automobile fuel efficiency in 1978. The US automobile manufacturers, who had 
specialized in producing large-sized vehicles, failed to adapt successfully to the changed 
conditions. Japanese automobile manufacturers were able to take advantage of this 
situation to penetrate the US market because they focused on high-quality smaller 
vehicles and had improved price competitiveness by means of innovative 'lean 
production' systems. Japanese auto exports increased rapidly in the 1970s  
(Shimokawa 1985,pp.63-64; Shimokawa 1990, p.69) . 
 One pillar of business restructuring by US automobile manufacturers to regain 
competitiveness was to integrate Mexico into the network of North American 
automobile production, taking advantage of the lower labor costs. The massive 
investment in engine plants in Mexico from the end of the 1970s was a part of this 
strategy. However, before the external debt crisis of 1982, the institutional setting in 
Mexico was not yet suited for exports. It was the issue of the 1983 decree that helped 
establish conditions in Mexico for increased exports. 
In the 1980s the competition among automobile manufacturers in the US 
market intensified due to Japanese investments in local production. The investment 
started in order to evade the voluntary restriction of vehicle exports agreed between the 
US and the Japanese governments in 1981. Faced with the intensification of competition, 
the US automobile manufacturers began restructuring. This affected Mexico in the 
following ways. 
Firstly they adopted a new strategy of making Mexico the production site of 
newly designed smaller vehicles, and of engines and labor-intensive auto-parts for the 
North American market. For that purpose they expanded their investments in Mexico. 
To cope with their move, Volkswagen and Nissan also expanded investment in Mexico9. 
Secondly, US assemblers began to separate their auto-parts divisions and 
increased outsourcing from auto-parts suppliers in order to concentrate on the 
development of vehicles and on their assembly, which is the highest value-added 
process in automobile production. Among auto-parts firms, the concentration of 
                                                   
9 Expansion of assemblers’ investment in Mexico is analyzed for GM by Carrillo (2004), 
for Ford by Studer-Noguez (2000), for VW and German auto-parts suppliers by Carrillo 
and González (1999) and for Nissan by Rodríguez (1992).    
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production proceeded (Sturgeon, Biesebroeck and Gereffi 2008, p.305)10. Competition 
among firms was an important factor in changing the boundary of firms in the 
automobile industry. Catching up of Nemak to global auto-parts suppliers was achieved 
by taking advantage of opportunities that emerged as boundaries changed.  
 
2. Requisites of Global Suppliers and the Strategy of Nemak 
 
 In the trajectory of catching up of Nemak, it is possible to point out two 
important steps which enabled the firm to acquire indispensable capabilities required by 
global auto-parts suppliers. The first step was its acquisition in 2000 of Ford’s Canadian 
aluminum foundry plant for cylinder heads and engine blocks. The second step was a 
series of acquisitions starting in 2005 of aluminum foundry firms outside of the North 
American continent.  
 The first step is important in the sense that by this acquisition Nemak assured 
its position as a first-tier supplier of its products in the North American production 
networks of the US big three automobile manufacturers. Since the 1980s the changeover 
of engine material from iron to aluminum occurred in the global automobile industry to 
achieve vehicle weight reduction for better fuel efficiency. Ford's divested Canadian 
plants opened in 1994. From the second half of the 1990s Ford adopted the strategy of 
outsourcing auto-parts, and in 1997 its auto-parts division had been spun off as a 
separate auto-parts company Visteon. The separation of Ford's Canadian plants took 
place under the same strategy. In spite of the capital participation of Ford, Nemak's 
market was not limited to Ford but also included Chrysler and GM.11 Nemak became a 
major North American regional supplier of aluminum engine parts by taking advantage 
of the business restructuring of automobile manufacturers and by focusing on the niche 
space that had emerged in the network. 
 In 2005 Nemak started making acquisitions outside of the North American 
continent. It proceeded by in 2005 acquiring Rautenbach Guss, a German manufacturer 
of aluminum cylinder heads which had plants in Germany and Slovakia and supplied 
Volkswagen, Daimler and Porsche. In 2007 Nemak acquired the aluminum foundries of 
                                                   
10 On the concentration of production among auto-parts firms, there are case studies on 
Delphi by Lara and Carrillo (2000), on Packard Electric and Delphi by Lara (2002) and 
on Lear Corporation by Lara, Turjano and Garcia-Garnica (2005).    
11 Annual report of Alfa for the year 2005 reports the distribution of sales by clients as 
follows; Ford 52%, Chrysler (then Daimler Chrysler) 20%, and GM 14% (Alfa, Informe 
anual 2006, p. 23).  
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Hydro Aluminum Casting, a Norwegian firm whose plants were located in Austria, 
Germany and Hungary and supplied cylinder heads and blocks to Audi, BMW, Daimler, 
Ford and Opel. In the same year it also acquired foundry plants of TK Aluminum 
located in Mexico, the US, China, Poland, Brazil and Argentina. This firm was formerly 
Teskid, the initial joint venture partner that provided the technological assistance to 
Nemak. By this acquisition Nissan, Hyundai, Toyota, Fiat, and Peugeot SA were added 
as clients. In 2012 Nemak acquired J. L. French Automotive Casting, a US 
manufacturer of transmission and engine castings with plants in the US and Spain 
providing first-tier global system suppliers such as Magna and ZF. Apart from these 
acquisitions, Nemak invested in new plants in 2003 in the Czech Republic, and in 2010 
and 2012 in India and China respectively, in order to supply Ford’s local plants12. 
The acquisitions and the investment in new plants were important to Nemak for 
raising its position from North American regional supplier to global supplier. Its 
importance derives from the following characteristics of transactions between 
assemblers and suppliers in the GPN. Firstly, the production networks of automobile 
manufacturers and assemblers extend globally, but assemblers require first-tier suppliers 
to locate their technology centers and production plants nearby in order to reduce the 
lead time in development and production, and to respond quickly to requests for any 
modification of products which is needed to adapt to local market requirements. Plants 
near principal locations of automobile production in the world are indispensable for 
global first-tier suppliers (Sturgeon, Biesebroeck and Gereffi 2008, p.303). Secondly, 
due to the increasing outsourcing of auto parts by automobile manufacturers, first-tier 
suppliers are likely to engage in design and development of auto parts. As a result, the 
relationship between assemblers and first-tier suppliers became closer than before. It is 
difficult for latecomers to enter into a supply chain which is linked by close 
relationships. One of the effective ways to enter the chain was to internalize the 
relationship itself by acquisition. 
Acquisitions also provided Nemak with other benefits. Nemak could upgrade 
its capability by absorbing technology from leaders in technology such as Teskid. 
Another benefit was reduction of dependence on Ford for capital and market for its 
products. In the process of globalization of the business, Ford’s share in ownership in 
Nemak was reduced from 20% in 2004 to 6.76% in 2012. This suggests that expenses of 
                                                   
12 Information on the acquisitions by Nemak is taken from the annual report (Reporte 
anual) of Alfa submitted to the Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores) 
from the year 2002 to 2012.    
23 
 
the acquisition and the construction of new plants were borne mainly by Alfa. In the 
total sales of Alfa, Ford’s share dropped from 52% in 2005 to 33% in 2012 including 
sales to Ford Europe. Nemak's list of clients was widely diversified by 2012.13 
 
3. Catching Up of Nemak and Alfa’s Competitive Asset 
 
 The strategy of Nemak for catching up to the global suppliers was planned and 
implemented under the auspices of Alfa. In the final part of this section, I consider what 
the role of Nemak is in the business strategy of Alfa, and how Nemak’s success in 
catching up is related to characteristics of Alfa as a business group. It will help to 
understand why firms that survived changing institutional settings were mainly 
subsidiaries of business groups. 
 Alfa is a diversified business group with interests by 2012 in petrochemicals, 
foods, auto parts, and telecommunication, and has recently begun exploration for natural 
gas and petroleum. Although Alfa has been a diversified business group from its 
inception, since 2000 two changes can be observed in its diversification. Firstly, the 
range of business was narrowed to a smaller number of selected industries, with the first 
four of the above-mentioned industries remaining as the pillars of the group. In the 
process of selection, even the iron and steel business which had been considered the 
group’s symbol, was cut off from Alfa due to the heavy debt burden. Secondly, as in the 
case of auto-parts, Alfa also began overseas expansion by acquisitions in the 
petrochemical and food sectors. As a result, Alfa’s subsidiaries in these industries have 
grown into leading firms in the North American market (Hoshino 2013, p. 190). 
The business group is a typical way large firms are organized in countries that 
industrialized late (Hikino, Colpan, and Lincoln 2012). One of its frequently observed 
characteristics is diversification into technologically unrelated industries. Amsden and 
Hikino (1994) identified project execution capability acquired through repeated entries 
to new industries as a competitive asset of business group. They stressed that, in the 
growth of business groups, the knowledge gained through entries to new projects was 
accumulated and shared within the group, serving as competitive edges for cost 
reduction and efficiency, and as bases for improving production and innovation 
                                                   
13 The annual report of Nemak for the year 2012 reports the distribution of sales by 
clients as follows: Ford 33% (including Ford Europe), GM (including Shanghai GM and 
GM Opel) 21%, Chrysler 11%, Volkswagen 6%, BMW 5%, Hyundai-Kia 4%, Nissan 3%, 
Audi 2%, Renault 2%, Fiat 2%, Daimler 1% and others (Tenedora Nemak, Reporte anual 
2012, p. 52). 
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capabilities. At the same time, the imperfect market conditions of late industrialization 
justified the strategy of diversification. 
Alfa’s business is no longer confined to the imperfect market of its homeland, 
so that the diversification strategy loses some justification. However, I consider that 
diversification still has following advantage for Alfa. Since the diversified businesses of 
Alfa are loosely connected, it is still true that the knowledge gained in each sector is 
accumulated as a group resource to be shared among its various sectors. The flexible 
connections between sectors is observable, for example, in the promotion of managers 
and directors who move within the group's internal labor market and cross over to 
different sectors14. In the sense that Alfa tries to make a competitive asset from the 
loosely connected but unrelated diversified businesses, the actual strategy is inherited 
from the past. An important difference from the past is that the selection of businesses is 
more rational and focused, and that capabilities of each business sector are upgraded to 
a level of competing with global players, as the case of Nemak shows. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 The catching up of Nemak to the forerunners in the automotive GPN was 
favorably affected by three kinds of condition; the changing boundaries of the firms in 
the automobile industry, the changing institutional settings represented by the Mexican 
government’s development strategy, and the proprietary capabilities of Nemak and its 
parent company Alfa. 
 Alfa’s entry to the auto-parts sector and the acquisition of knowledge necessary 
for efficient production was made under the institutional setting of the transition of the 
development policy from ISI to export industrialization. The setting of the transition 
favored Alfa because it created a space for local firms by limiting assemblers’ 
boundaries to a restricted area and also because it encouraged assemblers to assist local 
firms to improve their capabilities by imposing the obligation of auto-parts exportation.  
Thus Alfa could acquire a niche space in the production network and the technological 
knowledge necessary from two joint venture partners, Ford and Teskid.  
The next step of Nemak in the catching up to global suppliers in its market 
segment was overseas expansion, first to North America and afterward outside of North 
                                                   
14 Promotion of manager crossing over to different sectors of the group is evidenced by 
the career records of principal managers in the annual reports submitted to the 
Mexican Stock Exchange.     
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America. The change of the boundaries of assemblers favorably affected this process. 
As a part of the restructuring made necessary by competition among automobile 
manufacturers, Ford separated its asset and transferred it to Nemak, strengthening 
Nemak’s position as a North American regional supplier. The final step in the catching 
up of Nemak was through acquisitions made outside of North America. The acquisitions 
made it possible for Nemak to locate its plants near the principal automobile 
manufacturers and assemblers, fulfilling this requirement to be a global supplier. 
The indispensable condition in all these steps was the capabilities Nemak and 
its parent company Alfa had for recognizing business opportunities and for project 
execution, absorption of knowledge, improving production, and innovation. 
It can be said that the catching up of Nemak is a success story of a unique firm 
that had the capabilities to take advantage of unique situations in the past, namely of the 
favorable coincidence of the institutional setting and business opportunities in the 
industry. In this sense, the trajectory of Nemak will not be possible to repeat. But even 
so, I think that we can learn several lessons from the case of Nemak. 
Firstly, the boundaries of firms in the GPNs often change due to competition 
among firms and learning by firms, so that the doors are not closed for latecomers. In 
this paper I focused on the transactions between automobile manufacturers and first-tier 
suppliers of the automobile industry, where the highest level of capabilities is required 
for the entry. However, even in the automobile industry, the changeable boundaries are 
not limited to those between assemblers and the first-tier suppliers, but exist everywhere 
in the stratified structure of the supply chain. The required capabilities are different 
according to the location within the structure, so that different kinds of doors for entry 
can exist. For firms hopeful of entry to the chain, the first step should be the search for 
an entry door that matches its capabilities. 
Secondly, between the hopeful entrants and the forerunners in the production 
network, there exist gaps in their level of knowledge. Hopeful entrants can catch up 
through learning. In the period of ISI, the government regulation served as the 
institutional setting that encouraged transfer of knowledge from foreign firms to local 
firms and Nemak was a beneficiary of the ISI policy. In this sense the former ISI policy 
did affect the level of capabilities of Mexican firms. In the era of globalization, 
government regulation has lost its efficiency and justification, especially in the GPN, so 
other kinds of institutional settings which help the entry and the catching up of local 
firms are needed. The role of government is still important in this respect． 
Thirdly, although the existence of doors to entry and favorable institutional 
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settings are necessary conditions for the entry and the catching up of local firms in the 
GPN, the most important and indispensable condition is the will and the efforts for 
capability building by firms. Without it, the success story will never start.  
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